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A B S T R A C T
In the context of ongoing debates about the place of knowledge and expertise in the governance of global
challenges, this article seeks to promote cross-sectoral learning about the politics and pitfalls of global science
advice. It begins with the intertwined histories of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the
global climate policy regime, before examining the politics of diﬀerent ‘framings’ of the climate problem and the
challenges of building and communicating scientiﬁc consensus. We then identify three important trade-oﬀs
which the IPCC has had to negotiate: global versus local; scientiﬁc disinterestedness versus policy-relevance; and
consensus versus plurality. These lessons are especially timely as global institutions begin to convene knowledge
to address urgent sustainable development challenges posed by anti-microbial resistance (AMR). While the IPCC
experience does not provide a wholly transportable model for science advice, we show why similar trade-oﬀs
need to be addressed at an early stage by architects of advisory systems for AMR as well as other global chal-
lenges.
1. Introduction
The need for integrating diﬀerent sources of knowledge is a major
theme in contemporary debates on environmental policy. Given the
prominence of biophysical sciences in characterizing environmental
problems, the job of knowledge integration is often associated with
institutions at the science/policy interface tasked with providing sci-
ence advice (Wesselink et al., 2013). Modelled on national science
advisory bodies, such institutions are meant to fulﬁl the role of asses-
sing the state of research on a given issue and synthesizing relevant
evidence for policymaking. However, there is growing recognition of
the need to open up these institutional arrangements to scrutiny so as to
understand how diﬀerent inputs are integrated in practice (Borie and
Hulme, 2015; Scoones, 2009) and to consider ways of bridging scien-
tiﬁc inputs with those from other disciplines and from stakeholders. The
case for ‘opening up’ is set out in work calling for inter/trans-dis-
ciplinary research (Miller et al., 2014) and a broader notion of en-
vironmental expertise (Sörlin, 2013) beﬁtting the complexity of en-
vironmental challenges.
In this paper, we identify lessons for global environmental science
advice from the history of the most inﬂuential institution in this do-
main, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The
IPCC has pioneered new ways of assessing scientiﬁc knowledge across a
broad range of disciplines and interconnected topics, helping to cement
climate change within international policy agendas. A number of
scholars have written about the challenges of the IPCC ‘model’, for
example, in: adequately representing marginal peoples, places and
knowledges (Bjurstrom and Polk, 2011; Ford et al., 2016); delivering
authoritative and usable knowledge to policy-makers (Haas and
Stevens, 2011; Mitchell et al., 2006); and generating trust across diverse
social groups and political cultures (Beck, 2011; Jasanoﬀ, 2011). The
IPCC’s apparent success in at least partially overcoming these chal-
lenges prompted the establishment of the Intergovernmental Platform
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) in 2012 (Beck et al.,
2014; Montana, 2017) and calls for similar bodies to provide advice for
other global challenges such as antimicrobial resistance (Woolhouse
and Farrar, 2014), which is rapidly emerging as a major issue at the
environment/health interface (Antimicrobials in agriculture and the
environment: reducing unnecessary use and waste, 2015).
Observers from other grand policy challenges may envy the IPCC’s
undoubted symbolic power (Hughes, 2015). Yet attempting to transfer
this model of knowledge production to other issues is problematic
without detailed analysis of the IPCC’s role in both climate science and
politics and how this might inform science advice in other cases. There
is therefore an urgent need for scholars of the science-policy interface to
work across diﬀerent domains. This paper helps fulﬁl this need, joining
emerging work generating comparative perspectives and lessons (Beck
et al., 2014; Esguerra et al., 2017; Jabbour and Flachsland, 2017;
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Kowarsch and Jabbour, 2017).
The paper begins with the emergence of the IPCC and the global
climate regime (Section 2), an analysis of the framing of the climate
problem (3), and the conceptualisation of science advice as consensual
(4). From these, we identify three trade-oﬀs that require attention when
developing advice: ‘global vs local’, ‘scientiﬁc disinterestedness vs
policy relevance’ and ‘consensus vs plurality’ (5). We then examine the
implications of these trade-oﬀs for a contemporary example, anti-
microbial resistance (AMR) (6) before returning to the wider implica-
tions for science advice. Our focus on AMR is timely as it is now ac-
knowledged as an urgent challenge for sustainable development and
eﬀorts to synthesise scientiﬁc evidence for global policy recommenda-
tions are emerging (WHO, 2017). We combine key ﬁndings from many
years of published qualitative research on climate science and the IPCC,
with original social research on how AMR is being understood as an
environmental phenomenon.
2. Emergence of the IPCC and the global climate regime
The IPCC is widely regarded as a successful example of global sci-
ence advice. Its voluminous assessment reports are produced by thou-
sands of volunteer scientists working across three Working Groups
dealing with physical science (WGI), social and ecological impacts and
adaptation (WGII), and mitigation options (WGIII). Both report outlines
and ﬁnal content are approved by government representatives, and are
intended to form the scientiﬁc basis for governmental policy-making.
The IPCC was formed in 1988 under the World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP). Strong consensus statements emerged from scientiﬁc con-
ferences on climate change in the mid-1980s, but it was perceived by
many that the political complexity of climate change was such that
more was needed to drive political action. In light of dissatisfaction
with the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, a small, underfunded
advisory group set up in 1986 by WMO, UNEP and the International
Council of Scientiﬁc Unions which was arguably too distant from the
policy process to be eﬀective, calls were made for a more comprehen-
sive international assessment eﬀort (Agrawala, 1998). Following com-
plex negotiations between WMO and the US Government, the road was
paved for the creation of the IPCC.
The IPCC’s emergence coincided with, and reinforced, a re-
conceptualization of ‘climate’ as a complex, global system. This followed
decades of scientiﬁc work on general atmospheric circulation, on the
data and modelling infrastructures required to study it (Edwards,
2010), and the emergence of new ideas about the management of en-
vironmental problems through global cooperation (Miller, 2004). It was
the novelty of the latter which arguably drove the desire for an inter-
governmental institution, with various competing actors, not least across
diﬀerent US Government departments, keen to ensure governmental
oversight of such consequential knowledge-making (Agrawala, 1998).
The initial focus was to provide a comprehensive assessment of
climate change and its potential impacts, while debating the relative
merits of possible responses. A number of developing countries ex-
pressed unease at this positioning of the IPCC across the science-policy
interface, fearing that the Western dominance of climate science would
enable them to dictate the terms of global climate policy. In 1990 the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee was formed as a separate
setting for drafting what would become the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Post-1990, the IPCC reverted more to
scientiﬁc assessment, promising policy neutrality across its three
Working Groups. IPCC Assessment Reports consist of each Working
Group’s own report, plus a succinct, collaborative Synthesis Report.
Five Assessment Reports have been completed between 1990 and 2014,
with preparations for a sixth beginning in 2015. These assessments
inform parties to the UNFCCC and underpin UN negotiations.
The IPCC’s core task is to assess all the available science and issue
consensus statements about the present and future states of
anthropogenic climate change. The IPCC has also addressed direct
policy questions, such as the potential meanings of ‘dangerous’ climate
change and has provided focused assessments of topical questions like
extreme weather (IPCC, 2012), renewable energy (IPCC, 2011) and the
impacts of 1.5 °C of warming in Special Reports (IPCC, 2016).
3. Framing the climate problem
The most widely discussed ﬁndings of the ﬁve Assessment Reports
have concerned global mean temperature rises to date and in future,
and scientists’ ability to attribute these rises to human activities. This
may seem normal now, but it wasn’t to many in the 1980s. Russill
(2016) has argued that this period saw a struggle to ‘frame’ climate
change as either a question of global trend detection and management,
or as a question of local climate-society interactions and bottom-up risk
management. Trend detection won out, due in part to the new dom-
inance of global models, but also, Russill suggests, to contemporary US
energy politics where the management of global trends was a dominant
mode of thought across science and politics. Similar preoccupations
with the global also emerged in other domains including that of
‘emerging infectious diseases’ which paved the way for conceptualizing
health policies in terms of security (King 2002). However, in the IPCC’s
evolution over the next two decades, we can trace a shift in framings
from climate change as a problem of additional carbon dioxide and
temperature, to a problem of risk management, albeit at an increasingly
global scale. In recent WGII reports in particular, some of the concerns
of the dissenting 1980s scientists, who lobbied for risk management
rather than trend detection/management approaches, are starting to be
addressed, through approaches which marry top-down framings of
vulnerability with bottom-up, contextualised understandings of cli-
mate-society relationships (O’Neill et al., 2017).
Implicit in any framing of climate change as a problem of global
trend management is the assumption that climate change is a well-
structured technical problem, within which scientiﬁc advice could act
as a trigger for international policy agreement (Hoppe et al., 2013).
However, many social scientists have argued that climate change is
actually an unstructured, or ‘wicked’ problem at the global level,
spanning both social and climate systems and containing deep cultural
and political diﬀerences over values, goals and meanings (Demeritt,
2001; Hoppe et al., 2013). Framing climate change as a global problem
with global solutions has been a natural progression of trends in both
science and politics, but the result has been a heavily centralised supply
of scientiﬁc advice that neglects the need for geographically diﬀer-
entiated and plural policy approaches (Hoppe et al., 2013).
Problem framings have powerful eﬀects on how solutions are con-
ceptualised. Some have worried that the IPCC’s emphasis on global
trend detection has pushed adaptation to the end of a chain of accu-
mulating impacts where it functions as the social cost of failed miti-
gation (Beck, 2010; Hulme, 2011). Some have argued for more con-
certed thinking about adaptation to already evident climatic extremes,
and less about determining their direct cause (Hulme et al., 2011).
Certain framings may also play better in diﬀerent political cultures. For
example, trend and/or risk management may appeal in North America,
where the burden of proof is often placed on proponents of environ-
mental regulation, but may not sit so well with more precautionary
attitudes in Europe (Jasanoﬀ, 2005; Mahony, 2015). In the global
South, the IPCC has also faced controversy in the way it has framed
Southern forests as ‘empty’ spaces available to suck up the global
North’s carbon pollution (Fogel, 2005), and in its valuing of Southern
lives at lower levels than Northern lives (Masood, 1995). This shows
that in controversial issues like climate change, scientiﬁc claims may
not be simply ‘neutral’. Rather, they shape the contours of how we think
– politically, ethically, culturally – about responding to the issue at
hand. Institutions like the IPCC exert great political and symbolic power
(Hughes, 2015), and therefore face dilemmas about how to frame sci-
entiﬁc issues in ways which are credible, legitimate and salient
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(Mitchell et al., 2006) to a wide range of audiences.
The IPCC has responded by broadening the disciplinary make-up
and forms of knowledge going into its assessments. However, repeated
criticisms have been made of the under-representation of social science
and humanities disciplines (other than economics, which is well re-
presented), despite their capacity to provide vital knowledge about the
key drivers and potential victims of climate change: human beings and
their societies (Bjurstrom and Polk, 2011; Minx et al., 2017). The IPCC
has also been dominated by scientists from the global North (Ho-Lem
et al., 2011), leading to worries of bias towards problems and framings
which are of greatest concern to Northern scientists and politicians
(Orlove et al., 2014). In the case of India, low participation of both
scientiﬁc and political actors has been attributed to both a lack of
governmental interest in the science (as opposed to the politics) of
climate change, and to a deeper distrust of institutions such as the IPCC
as potential vehicles of western diplomatic power (Biermann, 2001;
Lahsen, 2007). Indeed, it was for this reason that India was among
those calling for the IPCC’s pre-1990 policy negotiation function to be
removed (Miller, 2009). However, such patterns are not purely na-
tional. Distinctive epistemic communities exist within both India and
Brazil, with some scientists from independent, elite research institutions
are often directly connected to international networks of scientiﬁc
collaboration and assessment, while others are tied to national research
institutions focusing on more on localised research questions (Lahsen,
2009, 2007; Mahony, 2014).
The IPCC’s treatment of the social complexities of climate change
impacts has nonetheless evolved over time, even if concepts like in-
equality or justice are yet to become key organising concerns. Debates
have ranged over how to bring in the knowledges and experiences of
people on the ‘frontline’ of climate change, for instance, in the Arctic.
This might mean revising how expert authors are selected and included
(Ford et al., 2016; Yamineva, 2017), or how diﬀerent types of knowl-
edge are rendered credible and thus proper for inclusion. The IPCC’s
controversial 2010 mistake regarding the timescale for Himalayan
glaciers melting away brought to the fore questions about the inclusion
of ‘grey literature’ in assessments− literature which may not have been
through the vetting procedures of scientiﬁc peer review, but which may
nonetheless feature important insights from places where accredited
scientists may have yet to tread (Mahony, 2014). The subsequent
tightening of the IPCC’s guidelines on utilising grey literature has in-
troduced new quality control measures. This may enable certain ﬁnd-
ings to receive the kind of validation usually bestowed by peer review,
but it may also risk the exclusion of certain forms of knowledge− and
thus people and places – from the assessment process.
4. Science advice as consensus
The IPCC has, since its ﬁrst assessment report, sought to deliver to
policymakers a consensus statement on the state of climate science.
Consensus has become the hallmark of the IPCC process, achieved
through the processes of collective authorship among large groups of
scientists, a lengthy expert and government review process, and in li-
vely plenary sessions where government representatives oﬀer their
approval (or disapproval) of the key ﬁndings. For many, this pre-
sentation of a uniﬁed scientiﬁc voice has been central to the IPCC’s
authority to frame the global debate (Pearce et al., 2015). There is a
symbolic power to the IPCC’S self-positioning as the voice of a singular
scientiﬁc community, labouring for many years to oﬀer universal truths
unto the altar of politics, where they may either be lauded as sacro-
sanct, or sacriﬁced to the higher gods of political ideology and material
interest. However, while consensus-seeking may bring symbolic and
political power, it may also tarnish the process of producing objective
assessments. A famous case concerned the estimation of end-of-century
sea level rise in the 2007 report, wherein new modelling techniques
suggested much higher rates of change than previous assessments.
However, the unreliability of these results, owing to their
comparatively new underlying methodology, meant that consensus
could not be reached on them, and they were excluded in favour of
more conservative statements (O’Reilly et al., 2012). Here, a question
arises of whether policy-makers would be better served by being in-
formed of not only what everyone can agree on, but of the likelihood –
however low, controversial, or diﬃcult to quantify – of high-magnitude
future events, like rapid sea level rise, that carry great societal im-
plications (Hansen, 2007; Oppenheimer et al., 2007).
Consensus also raises important questions about how best to re-
present uncertainty. There are many forms and sources of uncertainty –
incomplete understandings, observational and model error, expert dis-
agreement, and so on – which are hard to communicate in a single
language. The IPCC developed a set of likelihood and conﬁdence
statements with the aim of formalising uncertainty communication, and
of encouraging authors to more systematically evaluate uncertainty.
Consensus is therefore about agreement and disagreement, with un-
certainty guidance urging communication of levels of agreement on
particular ﬁndings as low, medium or high. These practices have slowly
worked their way across the Working Groups, but have been shown to
be incompletely understood, particularly by non-scientiﬁc audiences
(Barkemeyer et al., 2016; Budescu et al., 2014)
The challenges of consensus and communication also relate to
problem framing, and the frequent inseparability of the epistemic and
the normative in climate change science. The IPCC’s attempts to pro-
duce state of the art, ‘policy-neutral’ scientiﬁc observations of the world
are perhaps commonsensical, but they sometimes mean overlooking the
societal values and processes that underlie the very processes they seek
to describe. One example of the intermingling of facts and values is the
recent controversy over so-called ‘negative emissions’ technologies in
IPCC scenarios. These technologies, at this point untested, were crucial
in generating scenarios in which the world stayed below the agreed
upon threshold of dangerous climate change. However, questions of the
social and political feasibility of these technologies, which would in-
volve giving huge swathes of land over to bioenergy production, were
side-stepped by the IPCC and science advisors, and the centrality of
these technologies to the scenarios underplayed (Geden, 2015). There
are important questions here about how scientists should negotiate the
links between questions of technical and social feasibility of new
technologies, for example, but also about how transparent they should
be about the assumptions and values underpinning descriptions of the
world as it is, and predictions of the world as it could – or ought – to be.
For many, closer forms of knowledge ‘co-production’ (or collaboration
between knowledge makers and users in assessment processes) is key to
tackling these complexities, especially as bodies like the IPCC seek to
move to more ‘solution-oriented’ approaches (Kowarsch and Jabbour,
2017; Tollefson, 2015).
5. Three trade-oﬀs in the IPCC
The IPCC is an extraordinary institution – perhaps the largest ex-
ercise in scientiﬁc cooperation ever embarked upon, and the producer
of knowledge claims which have underpinned the steady push for
global policy action. It is therefore unsurprising that policy actors in
other global challenge domains have called to emulate it. For example,
in biodiversity (Beck et al., 2014), biotechnology risks (Bowerman,
2014), food (Maxwell, 2015), water (World Water Week, 2017) and
AMR (Woolhouse and Farrar, 2014). But since global emissions con-
tinue to rise and some still publicly question the reality of climate
change, questions have been asked about whether the incremental in-
creases in top-line certainty in IPCC reports on global warming trends
and anthropogenic causation, are worth the years of eﬀort of thousands
of scientists. It is therefore important to reﬂect on this history and draw
lessons from it, both for the IPCC and for science advisory processes
with similar ambitions. In particular, there are trade-oﬀs to consider in
designing similar institutions and processes of scientiﬁc assessment and
advice. We highlight three:
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i) global vs local: between scientiﬁc knowledge that speaks of ab-
stract global systems to a global audience, and knowledge that pertains
more closely to local settings where the drivers and impacts of global
change are more directly experienced. This dynamic plays out diﬀer-
ently across the IPCC’s Working Groups, and reﬂects global distribu-
tions of expertise and knowledge which the IPCC cannot itself do much
to change. However, regionally-focused assessments could help in-
tegrate more locally relevant information into the IPCC process.
ii) scientiﬁc disinterestedness vs policy relevance: between pro-
cesses which aim to stay ﬁrmly on the science side of the science-pol-
itics boundary, sticking to the norm of scientiﬁc disinterestedness, and
processes which engage more directly with value-laden policy ques-
tions. The former strategy may help enhance the scientiﬁc authority of a
process, but perhaps at the cost of direct policy relevance. The IPCC has
long guarded the norm of ‘policy relevant, never policy prescriptive’,
but steering clear from values-based questions has diminished IPCC
reports’ practical utility. particularly within adaptation and mitigation
where ‘is’ and ‘ought’ are often entangled. For example, scientiﬁc dis-
interestedness resulted in CO2 emissions being treated as homogenous
in early discussions of climate change. Subsequently, a distinction made
between ‘subsistence’ and ‘luxury’ emissions showed that CO2 emission
measures are inﬂected with social and normative meaning (Agarwal
and Narain, 1991).
iii) consensus vs plurality: between unitary, consensus statements
and the representation of conﬂicting views (Kowarsch et al., 2017).
Consensus-seeking may enhance scientiﬁc authority, and please policy-
makers who value non-ambiguous statements (Mahony, 2013) but can
also, as shown above, lead to important omissions of uncertain ﬁndings,
or of conﬂict and disagreement. Social science research has shown that
it is wrong to assume that decision-makers value only unanimity and
certainty (Stirling, 2010), and that scientiﬁc consensus provides a poor
starting point for political progress (Pearce, 2014; Pearce et al., 2017).
Mediating between conﬂicting opinions and handling uncertainty is the
bread and butter of politics; and scientiﬁc advisory processes may
beneﬁt from acknowledging points of disagreement. Indeed, their role
of knowledge appraisal, properly understood, calls for expanding the
range of alternative policy options and clarifying what underlies them
rather than prematurely closing down what is considered feasible or
desirable (Stirling, 2008).
Hence, the IPCC model is not easily transferable to other global
challenges. Global (as opposed to national) science advice involves
diﬀerent design and problem framing choices that should be openly
considered by a range of actors, and at the earliest available opportu-
nity. As we have illustrated through the three trade-oﬀs above, there
are no perfect solutions when providing policy-relevant global science
advice. However, awareness of the issues that have repeatedly surfaced
during the IPCC’s history provides a sound platform for decision-
making and future learning. In the next section, we work through the
implications of our analysis for one of the most urgent global policy
challenges: AMR.
6. The case of AMR
We examine the case of AMR for three reasons. First, it is widely
regarded as an urgent global policy challenge requiring multi-state
cooperation (United Nations, 2016). Second, AMR is signiﬁcant as it
aﬀects multiple sustainable development goals, much like climate
change (Jasovský et al., 2016; United Nations, 2016). Third, there is
rising interest in evidence synthesis to inform AMR policy, notably,
around the use of antibiotics for food animals (Review on Antimicrobial
Resistance, 2015; WHO, 2017). However, there is little evidence of
reﬂections on approaches and methods of evidence assessment for AMR
policy. We now show why this is needed since science is unsettling
conventional boundaries between AMR in humans and environmental
phenomena (Singer, 2017) and AMR is being redeﬁned as a multi-sec-
toral challenge for food security and sustainable livelihoods as well as
health (Jasovský et al., 2016).
In 2016, United Nations members pledged to implement the World
Health Organization’s (WHO) 2015 Global Action Plan on AMR, one of
whose objectives is to strengthen the knowledge and evidence base for
action. Hopes that this knowledge can help broker global policy co-
operation and action rest in part on the assumption that “the science
around antimicrobial resistance is less contested than that of climate
change” (“Antibiotic resistance: only global co-operation will succeed
against this deadliest of threats,” 2014). But just as global versus local
framings of climate science vied for inﬂuence in the 1980s (Russill,
2016), similar debates are likely on how to understand the inﬂuence of
diﬀerent human activities on AMR. Already there is an emerging
question on distinguishing the impact of anthropogenic uses of anti-
biotics versus resistance ‘in the wild’ (Allen et al., 2010). The WHO’s
(2017) guidelines on reducing animal antibiotic use are framed around
what it says is ‘low quality evidence’, thus inviting controversy. To
minimise intractable science-focused debate and encourage wider dis-
cussions on underlying frames of assessment (Morris et al., 2016), ad-
visory institutions for AMR must be better prepared to learn the lessons
of the IPCC model.
Viewed as an environmental phenomenon, AMR arises from the
collective fate of antibiotics, genes encoding resistance, and other pol-
lutants in the air, soil and water. In the late 1990s, the European
Commission’s scientiﬁc steering committee reviewed research on AMR
which they described as a phenomenon of global genetic ecology tout
court. They speciﬁed four ecological components in the transmission of
resistance: humans, animals, plants and soil-water (Opinion of the
Scientiﬁc Steering Committee on Antimicrobial Resistance, 1999). In
addition to antimicrobials and bacteria, they underlined the sig-
niﬁcance of horizontal gene transfer of resistance traits between do-
mains. The study of resistance genes in soil and water samples opened
up new questions for scientists on the role of diﬀerent environmental
selection pressures in AMR (Salyers and Amábile-Cuevas, 1997). In
addition to animal antibiotics, other matters of concern are emerging,
including linkages between AMR, antibiotic residues in antibiotic
manufacturing eﬄuent and in sewage, heavy metals and widely used
biocides (Martinez, 2009; Singer, 2017; Wellington et al., 2013)
Such relationships are challenging to pin down, not least because
antibiotics are already present in nature. Precisely because of this
complexity, more attention is needed to the question of what is ex-
pected from science and how diﬀerent sources of knowledge might be
brought together to inform decision-making. Here, we return to our
three trade-oﬀs from the IPCC, demonstrating their relevance for AMR.
i.) global vs local: That bacteria do not respect national borders is at
the heart of recent articulations of AMR as a global threat. UK and other
global North-led policy documents (Davies and Gibbens, 2013) refer to
the incursion of antibiotic-resistant bacterial strains into their terri-
tories – but rarely acknowledge the capacity for ﬂows in the other di-
rection. From an environmental perspective, cross-border ﬂows relate
not only to resistant bacteria but to horizontal transfer of resistance
genes and antimicrobial residues that have not been fully metabolized
in the body or other hosts. These may be linked to the movement of
goods as well as of people, calling attention to patterns of global trade.
In an echo of experiences with climate models, two tensions be-
tween universal and local frameworks of meaning are emerging in the
AMR science/policy interface. First, at the national level there is al-
ready evidence of disjuncture between i) global policy aspirations to
restrict the use of antibiotics in livestock on the basis that evidence of a
link to human health is suﬃcient (Antimicrobials in agriculture and the
environment: reducing unnecessary use and waste, 2015) and ii)
statements from, for example, the UK government which interprets
evidence as pointing only to the role of human antibiotic use (Davies
and Gibbens, 2013). Second, experts highlight a paucity of comparable
cross-national data on antibiotic usage, resistance proﬁles, and trans-
mission of AMR (Grace, 2015). As international and national agencies
develop systems of AMR surveillance and risk management in
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accordance with the WHO AMR Action Plan, it will be important to
consider how data-collection methods are standardised and how
countries manage the diversity of norms and practices even within their
borders.
ii.) scientiﬁc disinterestedness vs policy relevance: Advisors will
need to explore the value-laden questions shaping scientiﬁc assessments
of AMR risks and the formulation of science advice. As with CO2, the
physical properties of antimicrobial agents may be universal, but their
social properties are not. The inﬂuential Review on Antimicrobial
Resistance (2015) recommends setting targets on livestock antibiotic
use in the form of 50 mg/kg of meat. Whether and how this would work
on a global scale needs more discussion in light of potential con-
sequences of antibiotic restrictions on smallholders or subsistence
farmers who may already ﬁnd it diﬃcult to access the drugs. Equally,
the impact on antibiotic use of global drivers towards intensiﬁcation of
farming will need to be considered.
There is some evidence of such discussions amongst AMR experts.
For example, eﬀorts to promote industrialisation and intensiﬁcation of
agriculture in low- and middle-income countries will need to be re-as-
sessed if they are likely to create a ‘lock-in’ eﬀect of embedding anti-
biotic use for higher productivity. The UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organisation recommends priority action on restricting prophylactic
use of antibiotics in intensive farming but places this within a broader
assessment of options for supporting livestock development to meet the
Sustainable Development Goals (Grace, 2016). Also, a recent review by
the International Livestock Research Institute suggests a willingness to
acknowledge that scientiﬁc evidence alone is not enough, and that
normative questions can help steer the kinds of evidence that are worth
generating. Given the strong possibility that some antibiotic uses “could
cause irreversible harm, what actions are appropriate and which require
further evidence?” (Grace, 2015). Such trade-oﬀs will require more
scrutiny.
iii.) consensus vs plurality: As scientiﬁc interest in applying new
techniques to understand AMR grows, it is not surprising that AMR is
emerging as an epistemically complex phenomenon with the potential
for diverse criteria governing what counts as acceptable evidence for
particular claims. Again, there are parallels with climate change and
other environmental assessments, illustrated by a recent exchange in
Nature Reviews Microbiology on methods for ranking the risk of anti-
biotic resistance genes in the environment.
One scientiﬁc team (Martínez et al., 2015) oﬀers rules for deﬁning
the relative risks for human health associated with diﬀerent candidate
resistance genes. They suggest that these rules should focus on the
likelihood of genes being acquired by human pathogens. In response,
another group (Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson, 2015) argues that this
framework overly emphasises the risk of resistant pathogens arising
from known resistance genes in the environment and underplays the
greater threat of novel genes. By contrast with this focus on science-
based risk assessment, other scientists altogether acknowledge the
limits of ‘knowing’ AMR fully and argue for socially-inﬂected responses,
notably precaution (Boerlin and Reid-Smith, 2008; Kümmerer, 2009).
Advisory institutions for global AMR policy will need to engage with
these diﬀerent epistemic lenses, their ability to bring to light diﬀerent
aspects of a complex phenomenon and reﬂect on how to deal with such
diversity in scientiﬁc assessment and advice.
7. Conclusion
Knowledge produced for policy advice is based on diﬀerent stan-
dards to those of academic science (Jasanoﬀ, 1990). Our analysis sug-
gests that given signiﬁcant trade-oﬀs in knowledge assessments for
global challenges, advisory institutions must consider better ways of
building ‘serviceable truths’ (Jasanoﬀ, 1990). Their credibility is co-
produced with their institutional arrangements for handling key trade-
oﬀs and engaging diﬀerent parties (Guston, 2001), and the ability of
their normative commitments to speak to wider concerns about how
policy impacts are distributed within and across societies. At a time
when expertise is in question, bodies such as the IPCC, and their suc-
cessors in ﬁelds such as AMR, could be bolder about describing the
nature and value of their work in terms of collaborative truth-building,
rather than a narrow appeal to ‘science’.
In both climate change and AMR, this requires transforming the
culture of science advice to enable meaningful public and stakeholder
engagement, particularly where this helps elicit and test diﬀerent pro-
blem framings, expand the scope of possible solutions, and take dif-
ferential vulnerability seriously (Jasanoﬀ, 2003). To fulﬁl their critical
role at the interface of science and policy at a range of scales, advisory
institutions must move beyond scientiﬁc inputs alone. IPBES is starting
to show the diﬀerent models that are available (Esguerra et al., 2017;
Montana 2017). The language of carbon-dioxide emissions or re-
sistance-genes has helped call attention to global challenges, but is in-
adequate for developing solutions. Wider engagement can strengthen
accountability of science advice in negotiating the trade-oﬀs inevitably
encountered when assessing knowledge for global challenges.
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